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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OFTHE

STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court Case Number : 38502-2011
Bonneville County District Court Case Number CV-2010-4397
IN THE MATTER OF THE DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION OF MICHAEL
SHERMAN MECHAM,
MICHAEL SHERMAN MECHAM
PLAINTIFF--APPELLANT
vs.

STATE OF IDAHO TRAN"SPORTATION DEPARTMENT,
DEFENDANTS--RESPONDENTS

Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for Bonneville
County
Hon. Jon J. Shindurling, District Judge, Presiding

APPELLANT'S INITIAL BRIEF
Larren K. Covert
Swafford Law, P.C.
525 9th St
Idaho Falls, ID 83404
Attorneys for the Appellant

Alan Harrison
Harrison Law
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case is an appeal of the District Court's order sustaining the license suspension of
Michael Mecham, the Appellant.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mr. Mecham was issued a Notice of Suspension on June 2, 2010. R. p. 40. Mr. Mecham
requested an Administrative Hearing for the license suspension on June 7, 2010. R. p. 52. The
hearing was conducted on July 12, 2010 by Mark E. Richmond, hearing officer. R. p. 75-84. The
hearing officer issued a Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on July 14, 2010 Id.
This document sustained the license suspension. Mr. Mecham timely filed a Petition for Judicial
Review on July 23, 2010. R. p. 85-86. Oral argument on appeal was held on December 20, 2010.

R. p. 143. The district court took the matter under advisement and issued its Opinion and Order
on Appeal ("Order") on January 7, 2011. R. p. 142-147. Mr. Mecham appealed this order on
January 18, 2011. R. p. 152-155.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On June 1, 2010, at 11 :49 p.m., Deputy Austin Flegel of the Bingham County Sherriff's
Department was traveling on River Road when he "passed a vehicle sitting on the side of the
road with its lights on." R. p. 47, emphasis added. Deputy Flegel turned around to see if the
driver was ok. Id. Deputy Flegel found Mr. Mecham asleep against the door. Id. Deputy Flegel
asked for a driver's license and then for him to step out of the car. Id. Deputy Flegel preformed
field sobriety tests on Mr. Mecham and would arrest him for DUI. R. p. 47-48.
Mr. Mecham was taken to the jail by Deputy Flegel. Id. At the jail, Deputy Flegel asked
Deputy Eric Wren to administer the breath test. R. p. 60. Deputy Wren noted in his report that
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he was asked to perform the breath test at "approximately 0100 hours." Id. Deputy Wren states
that he "waited the 15 minutes prior to offering him the test." Id. The Intoxilyzer printout shows
the test was started at 1:00. R. p. 42. This printout was signed by Deputy Wren. Id. This printout
also includes a handwritten notation of 0029 above the line labeled "time first observed." Id.
Deputy Flegel signed the Notice of Suspension on June 2, 2010, suspending Mr. Mecham
for failing a breath test.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1.

Did the district court error in sustaining the license suspension of Mr. Mecham by

adopting the hearing officer's findings and conclusions that Mr. Mecham had not meet his
burden of proof on the issues of actual physical control and the 15 minute observation period?
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ARGUMENT
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of department
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke or restrict a person's driver's license. See
LC. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In a petition for judicial review, the district court
acts in its appellate capacity under IDAP A. The Court reviews the agency record independently
of the hearing officer's decision. Marshall v. ldaho Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idaho 337,340, 48
P.3d 666,669 (Ct.App.2002). The Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency
as to the weight of the evidence presented. LC.§ 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48
P.3d at 669. The Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998);

Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual determinations
are binding on the reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency,
so long as the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record.

Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd. oJComm's, 134 Idaho 353,357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000);
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669.
On review of a decision by the district court, rendered in its appellate capacity, this Court
examines the decision of the district Count directly. State v. Scott, 150 Idaho 123, 124, 244 P.3d.
622, 623, Idaho App. 2010. Over questions oflaw, this Court exercises free review. Id.
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory
authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in

the record; or ( e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 67-5279(3 ). The party
challenging the agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in
LC.§ 67-5279(3) and that a substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette
County Bd. of County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429,958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Marshall, 137
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set
aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." LC. § 67-5279(3).
LEGAL STANDARD
In conducting an administrative hearing on a license suspension, "The hearing officer
shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that:
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop the person
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the person had
been driving or was in actual physical control of a vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating
substances in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, l 88004C or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or ...
( d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating
substances administered at the direction of the peace officer were
not conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 188004." IC. l 8-8002A(7).
LC. § 18-8004(5) defines actual physical control as "being in the driver's position of the
motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor vehicle running."
Idaho Code, the Intoxilyzer manual and ISP Operating procedures require that prior to the
testing of the subject, the operator must closely observe the subject for the fifteen-minute period
immediately prior to the administration of the test. See State ofIdaho v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho
338, 340, 882 P.2d 993, 995 (Idaho App. 1994). Compliance with the testing standards and
protocol is a prerequisite to having the test results admitted. Id. at 339, 994.
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ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF THE VEHICLE
The district court and hearing officer improperly determined that Deputy Flegel
established that Mr. Mecham was in actual physical control of the vehicle. The hearing officer
relied on the Affidavit of Probable Cause of Deputy Flegel (R. p. 43-44) to establish actual
physical control of the vehicle. R. p. 78. The deputy's "statement" in that affidavit is only a
checkbox form where it is indicated that actual physical control was established by the
observations of officer 315. R. p. 43. The observations of Deputy Flegel are written out in his
report. R. p. 47-48. Deputy Flegel's observations are only that he observed the vehicle "sitting"
on the side of the road "with the lights on." R. p. 47. Deputy Flegel goes on to state that he saw
Mr. Mecham slouched over against the window in the front driver's seat. Id. There is nothing in
the affidavit that states that the motor was running or that vehicle was moving.
In Matter of Vogt, 117 Idaho 545, 789 P.2d 1136 (Idaho 1990), the Supreme Court
examined the requirement and definition of "actual physical control" in relation to a suspension
of a driver's license. The Court examined I.C.§18-8002 (7) which defines actual physical control
as being in the driver's position of the motor vehicle with the motor running or with the motor
vehicle moving. Id. In that case, the driver of the vehicle was sitting in the driver's seat behind
the steering wheel with the engine running. The Court found that these facts met the
requirements of § 18-8002(7).
The record before the hearing officer is completely absent any facts or statements that the
engine was running or that the vehicle was in motion. To the contrary, the vehicle was sitting on
the side of the road, only with the lights

011.

Lights

011

do not meet the statutory requirements

required to be in actual physical control of the vehicle.
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The district court ignored the requirements that the hearing officer's findings be based on
"substantial competent evidence on the record." Urrutia v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd. of Comm's,
134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. Here,
there is !!Q evidence whatsoever on the record about the engine running or the vehicle in motion.
No evidence cannot be determined to be substantial and competent evidence. Therefore the Court
should find that the hearing officer's findings were not based on substantial, competent evidence
and remand this matter.
Without the deputy stating the facts that meet the requirements to establish actual
physical control of the vehicle, it is improper and an abuse of discretion to determine otherwise,
as the statement is not supported by substantial evidence on the record. The district court failed
to review the record before the hearing officer to ensure that the findings were based substantial
and competent evidence. The hearing officer and the district were content with ignoring the
stated observations in the record for the conclusion statement of the checkbox in the affidavit.
The substantial and competent evidence in the record is that the observations by Officer Flegel
were insufficient to establish the elements required for actual physical control.
15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD
The hearing officer and the district court improperly concluded that the evidentiary
testing complied with the rule set out in the Idaho Code and the ISP Operating Procedures. The
evidentiary test was not conducted in compliance with the procedures set out by Idaho Law and
ISP Standard Operating Procedure.
As noted above, a fifteen-minute observation period is required to occur immediately
prior to the administration of the test. Deputy Wren was the officer who conducted the test and
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would be required to ensure the proper procedures were followed, including the 15 minute
observation period. R. p. 60.
The evidentiary testing occurred at 1:00 according to the printout from the Intoxilyzer. R.
p. 42. A 15 minute observation period would necessarily have had to occur for the 15 minutes
immediately prior to this time. In his statement, Deputy Wren clearly notes that he was not
involved until "approximately 0 100 hours." R. p. 60. This fact is supported by the Intoxilyzer
printout showing Deputy Wren began the testing at 01 :00. R. p. 42. While Deputy Wren in his
statement claims to have conducted a fifteen-minute observation period, this is clearly
contradicted by his own statements and the evidence in the record.
The hearing officer noted the clear and obvious contradiction with Deputy Wren's
statements when he stated, "the timelines in this record are confusing but not necessarily fatal."
R. p. 80. The hearing officer goes on to state, "Mecham failed to provide prima facie evidence
that the times noted in the record were calibrated with the clock on the Intoxilyzer 5000." Id.
This statement is followed with the unsupported statement that "the record establishes a valid
observation period occurred in this matter." Id. The hearing officer does not state when this
period occurred or who conducted the observation.
The hearing officer's conclusion that was adopted by the district court is not based on the
clear evidence in the record. Deputy Flegel's affidavit makes absolutely no mention of the
observation period or about the involvement of Deputy Wren. Deputy Wren clearly notes that he
was not involved in the testing until "approximately 0100 hours."
If this Court is to believe all the statements by the officers and the analysis by the hearing
officer then the fifteen-minute observation period immediately prior to the test occurred in a 46
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minute window created by the non-synchronization of the whatever time instruments the
deputies used during this process. This window is calculated from the "time first observed"
notation of 0029 hours on the Intoxilyzer printout signed by Deputy Wren and his statement that
he conducted a fifteen-minute wait period after he was asked to perform the testing at
"approximately 0100 hours."
The hearing officer determined that a valid fifteen-minute waiting period (that must
necessarily occur immediately prior to the test) occurred within this 46 minute waiting period, a
time three times as long as the observation period. The hearing officer apparently required Mr.
Mecham to show the calibration of every time keeping device available to Deputies Wren, Flegel
and at the jail. This absurd requirements ignores the statement of Deputy Wren and the clear time
on the Intoxilyzer.
To reach his conclusion that there was a valid 15 minute observation period, the hearing
officer had to make the unsupported assumption that the time keeping instruments were not
synchronized. There is simply no clear facts that there was any discrepancy in the time keeping
instruments used by the deputies. In fact, there is no information that the deputies used any time
keeping instruments.
The clear and substantial evidence on the record comes from Deputy Wren's own
statement. He was asked to perform the Intoxilyzer test "at approximately 0100 hours." While
the word "approximately" does allow for some interpretation and provides a window of time,
this window cannot be thrown open to encompass the entire fifteen-minute waiting period. To do
so would erase the requirement entirely. Based on this information, there was no time to have a
valid fifteen-minute observation period. Any finding otherwise again allows for law enforcement
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to make statements not based on the clear facts and have those facts improperly suspend a
driver's license. Any and all other interpretations require enough speculation and conjecture as to
make the clear statements on the record meaningless.

CONCLUSION
At the administrative hearing, Mr. Mecham clearly showed by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was not in actual physical control of the vehicle as it was not running and that
there was not and could not have been an valid fifteen-minute waiting period.
The hearing officer's conclusions and the adoption of those conclusions by the district
court is clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial competent evidence. The findings of
the hearing officer and district court should be set aside and the license suspension vacated.
Dated this 8th day of August, 2011.
SWAFFORD LAW P .C.

LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorney for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on August 8, 2011, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing brief in the format required to be served upon the State ofldaho Transportation
Department, by method indicated below.

,/ MAILING

Alan R. Harrison
Special Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
497 N. Capital Ave, Suite 210
Idaho Falls, ID 83402

D FAXING (208-552-1176)
D HAND DELIVERY
D COURTHOUSE BOX

DATED this 8th day of August, 2011.
SWAFFORD LAW P.C.

LARREN K. COVERT, ESQ.
Attorneys for Appellant

-13

